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Designing a Successful Adaptive Agent
for TAC Ad Auction
Meng Chang and Minghua He1 and Xudong Luo2
Abstract. This paper describes the design and evaluation of Aston-
TAC, the runner-up in the Ad Auction Game of 2009 International
Trading Agent Competition. In particular, we focus on how Aston-
TAC generates adaptive bid prices according to the Market-based
Value Per Click and how it selects a set of keyword queries to bid on
to maximise the expected proﬁt under limited conversion capacity.
Through evaluation experiments, we show that AstonTAC performs
well and stably not only in the competition but also across a broad
range of environments.
1 Introduction
In recent years, sponsored search [3, 7] has become the indispensable
source of revenue for Internet search engine companies like Google,
Yahoo and MSN/Bing. Instead of showing the same advertisement
to every user, it enables companies to promote their products to tar-
geted groups of consumers based on their search queries [8]. More-
over, pricing advertisement is through keyword auction which has
a number of advantages over the conventional negotiation between
the seller and the buyer such as price efﬁciency and resource-saving.
Thus, sponsored search has become one of the most efﬁcient and
proﬁtable forms of advertising and attracted considerable research
attention from various ﬁelds.
Figure 1. Activities cycle of each day in TAC AA 2009
The investigation of sponsored search generally falls into three cat-
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egories: (i) search user behaviour modelling, (ii) mechanism design
to improve its effectiveness and efﬁciency, (iii) strategy formulation
faced mainly by advertisers in order to maximise their return from a
budget-constrained advertising campaign. The Trading Agent Com-
petition Ad Auction (TAC AA3) has provided an ideal test bed for
advertiser strategies. In its scenario, there are three kinds of agents:
advertisers, publishers and users. The behaviour of the publishers
and users are generated by TAC AA server according to some ﬁxed
stochastic policy [5]. There are eight advertiser agents (entrants to
the competition) that compete against each other on ad placement
for search result given queries over 60 days of bidding periods.
In more detail, agents represent retailers of home entertainment
products featured by three manufacturers (Flat, Lioneer and PG)
and three components (TV, Audio and DVD). Altogether, there are
nine distinct products. A query generated by a user is a (manufac-
turer, component) pair and unspeciﬁed manufacturer or component
is denoted as ‘null’. In total, there are 16 possible queries at three
focus levels denoted by F0, F1, F2. The more speciﬁc the query,
the higher the focus level.
QF0 : {(null, null)}
QF1 : {(Flat, null), (Lioneer, null), (PG, null), (null, TV ),
(null, Audio), (null,DV D)}
QF2 : {(Flat, TV ), (Flat, Audio), (Flat,DV D),
(Lioneer, TV ), (Lioneer,Audio), (Lioneer,DV D),
(PG, TV ), (PG,Audio), (PG,DV D)}
On each day of the game and for each query type above, an auction
is run to determine the ad placements. Once an ad is clicked and leads
to a customer transaction, it is called a conversion. Based on the focus
levels, distributions of click probability Pclick, continuation prob-
ability Pcontinuation (probability that a user proceeds to click the
next ad), and conversion rate Pconversion differ between queries. In
addition, each advertiser is assigned a Manufacturer Speciality (MS)
and a Component Speciality (CS) in each game. If a query matches
MS, it will receive a high conversion value. If a query matches CS,
it will receive a high conversion rate. The number of conversion is
softly constrained by Distribution Capacity Ccap. TAC AA intro-
duces Ccap to impose the effect of diminishing marginal value [5] of
conversion: when the number of conversion increases to some point,
Pconversion will start to drop and result in lower conversion proﬁt
due to increased cost.
On each day of the game and for each query type, the advertiser
agent submits a bid to the publisher. Such a bid speciﬁes the bid
price (the maximum amount that an advertiser is willing to pay for
a click on his ad), the spend limit (the corresponding ad will be ex-
cluded once the spend limit is reached) and the ad display type (either
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generic or targeted). At the end of the game, agents are evaluated
based on their cumulative surplus: sales proﬁt less cost they paid for
all the clicks received in the game.
Figure 1 shows activities of each day of the game. On day d, each
advertiser agent ﬁrst receives market reports of day d-1, then decides
a bid for each query to submit for day d+1. The publisher ranks bids
submitted by different advertiser agents on day d-1 and works out a
price per click to charge on each query for each agent. As users click
on ads and buy products from advertiser agents, the server collects
every agent’s impression, position, clicks, conversion, revenue and
cost to generate market reports of day d. Bidding period begins from
day 0 and agents’ ﬁrst bid submission is for day 1. Consequently
market reports are available from day 2.
According to speciﬁc settings of TAC AA, designing a success-
ful agent mainly faces two challenges: a) without knowledge of
bid prices of other participants, what is the optimal position and
how to decide an appropriate bid price to target it? b) given non-
deterministic conversion limit, how to maximise proﬁt in terms of
both number of conversion and conversion value? To address the ﬁrst
problem, we ﬁnd an alternative way to build bid prices on Market-
based Value Per Click (MVPC) which can be estimated based on
system parameters or market reports. To overcome the second chal-
lenge, we estimate the true maximum number of conversion allowed
by distribution capacity and select only the most proﬁtable queries to
bid on and ﬁll the expected conversion allowance every day.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2
describes our agent. Section 3 analyses its performance and further
evaluate it by controlled experiments. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 AstonTAC
AstonTAC is composed of four components: Agent Knowledge Base,
Bid Price Generator, Query Selector and Ad Display Selector shown
in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Architecture of AstonTAC
Agent Knowledge Base is designed to process, organise and record
information from the server and turn them into knowledge for other
components to use. The information it deals with can be divided into
two categories: static information including setting parameters and
game initialisation information and dynamic run-time information
such as market reports received on daily basis. The other three com-
ponents collectively generate the bid B=〈b, l, t〉 for each query q and
submitted as a bundle on each day of the game. In particular, Bid
Price Generator (Section 2.1) calculates a bid price b. Query Selector
(Section 2.2) speciﬁes a spend limit l. Ad Display Selector (Section
2.3) makes the choice of ad display type t.
2.1 Bid Price Generator
Based on the availability of market reports, the whole game can be
divided into two phases: Phase One (day 0 and 1) and Phase Two
(from day 2 to 59). Bid price generation in both phases is based on
the same concept - Market-based Value Per Click (MVPC) - of each
query.
Deﬁnition 1 A query’s MVPC is the expected conversion revenue
minus advertising cost that a click on its ad can generate.
We introduce MVPC because we ﬁnd clicks a kind of special com-
modity as they are not retainable. In an auction of normal commod-
ity, the bidder is willing to pay up to his/her valuation for an item
because he/she can own the item after the payment. However, in
a keyword auction, clicks cannot be owned so that bidders always
want to make a proﬁt out of them. For this reason, we believe MVPC
is the true worth of a click to an advertiser. Unlike the conventional
Value Per Click [2, 9], MVPC is much more dynamic by incorpo-
rating the cost. Basically, if it is assumed that revenue-per-click is
independent of position [6] which is disapproved by [4], MVPC still
varies as cost-per-click (CPC) is expected to vary for different po-
sitions. Moreover, due to conversion limit, one query’s conversion
affects the others’ conversion rates rendering the change of revenue-
per-click such that MVPC reﬂects the real value of a query in an in-
terdependent multi-query environment. Therefore, if we can estimate
every query’s MVPC and set a bid price accordingly, our bids should
automatically approximate the best response to the market without
explicitly targeting any position. MVPC is estimated in two different
ways for different phases of the game.
2.1.1 Phase One
In phase one, MVPC is estimated using expected revenue-per-click
multiplied by a ﬁxed discount ratio rdiscount indicating the propor-
tion of proﬁt in revenue. Expected revenue-per-click is a product of
expected conversion value and conversion rate. Because MVPC is
based on static fundamental information, it is denoted as vstatic,
vstatic = Pconversion · vcon · rdiscount (1)
The conversion value vcon in above formula is given by,
vcon =
{
USP (1 + MSB) if qm = MS
2
3
USP + 1
3
USP (1 + MSB) if qm = null
USP otherwise
(2)
where USP (Unit Sale Price) is the standard conversion value,
MSB=50% is MS bonus rate [5] and qm denotes the manufacturer
part of a query. The ﬁrst branch of the above formula means qm=MS
queries receive a 50% higher conversion value than the normalUSP .
The second branch means qm=null queries has 1/3 probability to re-
ceive a higher conversion value and 2/3 probability to receive a nor-
mal conversion value. The third branch means if a query’s manufac-
turer part is a speciﬁc manufacturer other than MS, its conversion
value will be exactly USP .
Pconversion is calculated in a similar way,
Pconversion =
⎧⎨
⎩
(1+CSB)πl
1+CSBπl
if qc = CS
2
3
πl +
1
3
(1+CSB)πl
1+CSBπl
if qc = null
πl otherwise
(3)
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where qc denotes the component part of a query, CSB=50% is CS
bonus rate and πl (l∈ {F0, F1, F2}) denotes the baseline conver-
sion rate. A query’s conversion rate is primarily conﬁned by its πl in
accordance with its focus level. On this basis, if qc=CS, a superior
conversion rate calculated by function η(x, y) = xy
xy+(1−x) where
x=πl and y=(1 + CSB) will apply. If a query’s qc is null, it has 1/3
chance to receive the superior conversion rate because generally 1/3
user population’s preference matches the advertiser’s CS. If a query’s
qc is a speciﬁc component other than the advertiser’s CS, its conver-
sion rate will be exactly its corresponding πl.
The discount ratio rdiscount in Formula 1 is a value between 0
and 1. The best rdiscount is chosen so that AstonTAC’s accumula-
tive proﬁt in ﬁrst ﬁve day of the game is maximised in experimental
games.
By now, vstatic has been calculated. Apparently, queries with rel-
atively high vstatic are expected to produce more proﬁt on each con-
version and vice versa. Since slightly higher bid price does not neces-
sarily raise the cost due to the features of Generalised Second Price
[2, 3] mechanism, it is sensible to set high bid prices for relatively
high-value queries to increase their chance of receiving top posi-
tions. To counterbalance the possible increase of conversion from
high-value queries under restricted total conversion, relatively low
bid prices should be set for relatively low-value queries. To this end,
hq (80% ≤ hq ≤ 120%) is introduced to enforce the heuristic.
In addition, higher Ccap means more conversions and clicks are ac-
ceptable. Therefore, we also introduce hc ∈ {85%, 100%, 115%}4
so that AstonTAC generally bids lower when Ccap = 300 or higher
when Ccap = 500. Together bid of each query in phase one is given
by,
b0 = vstatic · hq · hc (4)
2.1.2 Phase Two
In phase two, dynamic MVPC denoted by vdynamic is calculated
according to dynamic market reports. Consequently, a query’s bid
b in phase two is built on its vdynamic and adjusted by distribution
capacity adapter δ and ranking mechanism adapter β simultaneously.
b = vdynamic · δ · β (5)
Dynamic MVPC Formula 6 incorporates information about a
query’s revenue, cost and clicks from recent W (W is the size of ag-
gregation window for distribution capacity. Speciﬁcally, W=5) days
to calculate average proﬁt of a click so far as the expected proﬁt a
click can possibly make on the next day.
vdynamic =
∑d−W
i=d−1 revenuei −
∑d−W
i=d−1 costi∑d−W
i=d−1 clicki
(6)
We aggregate W-day data for two reasons: (i) Ccap takes effect on
the basis of W-day aggregate number of conversion. (ii) it reduces
the unwanted ﬂuctuation of vdynamic caused by system dynamics.
As a result of the above formula, vdynamic is highly responsive and
adaptive to the change of environment represented by three key fac-
tors:
1. Search user population - it determines the baseline number of pos-
sible clicks, conversion and revenue
2. Competition intensity - it determines the ad rank and cost-per-click
4 hc, hq and rdiscount are chosen by the domain expert based on experiment
results.
3. Conversion probability - it determines the number of clicks
needed to generate a conversion
The rationale behind is that we map the above three factors to the
three components revenue, cost and clicks respectively in Formula 6.
revenue is an indicator of user population - a larger number of active
users tend to generate more revenue assuming other two factors are
ﬁxed. Cost is an indicator of competition intensity - assuming user
population is ﬁxed and Ccap is not ﬁlled, the severer the competi-
tion, the more it costs to maintain the same position. At last, number
of clicks is an indicator of the conversion probability - excess conver-
sion beyond Ccap will cause lower Pconversion which means more
clicks are needed to generate the same number of conversions.
Distribution Capacity Adapter Distribution Capacity Adapter is
designed to adapt our bid prices to Ccap ∈ {300, 400, 500} a de-
cisive factor in TAC AA explicitly. It strongly conﬁnes the adver-
tiser’s potential proﬁt by affecting conversion rates. According to the
focus levels, each agent’s query is set a default Pconversion,def by
the server. During the game, once W-day accumulative conversion
exceeds Ccap, the timely conversion rate Pconversion,t will start to
drop below Pconversion,def . When Pconversion,t is sufﬁciently low,
clicks will make losses rather than proﬁts because users only click on
the ad but almost never make a transaction. Hence, there is a trade-off
between number of conversions and conversion rates at which a crit-
ical number of conversion Ccrit(Ccrit > Ccap) occurred such that
proﬁt of next conversion equals to its cost. The aim of setting a bid-
ding constraint is to keep them both high so that accumulative proﬁt
can be maximised. Ccap is a soft constraint because exceeding Ccap
does not stop conversion but only reduce its probability. Ccrit can
be estimated (see Section 2.2) but cannot be used here because bids
are only allowed to be changed daily rather than every time a con-
version happens. Eventually, the ratio δ between Ccap and expected
W-day aggregate conversion by day d cagg,d is found to be a suitable
indicator of bid adjustment over vdynamic. To obtain δ, cagg,d is ﬁrst
estimated using weighted average,
cagg,d =
∑0
t=d−1(wt
∑t−(W−1)
i=t
ci)∑0
t=d−1 wt
(7)
where exponential weight wt = ωd−t−1 (0 < ω < 1) and ci de-
notes total conversion from all queries on day i. Then the adjustment
factor δ is given by,
δ =
Ccap
cagg,d
(8)
The intuition behind δ is: if δ > 1, Ccap is expected to be under-
ﬁlled on day d, then all bids are increased by δ, then the number of
clicks is expected to increase as well as the subsequent conversions
on day d+1; if δ < 1, all bids are reduced for the opposite effect. In
this game, δ falls in the range between 0.6 and 1.8.
Ranking Mechanism Adapter Ranking mechanism adapter ad-
justs the bid price further by taking into account of the ranking mech-
anism adopted by the publisher. TAC AA employs a squashing pa-
rameter χ(0 ≤ χ4 ≤ 1) initialised at the beginning of each game to
interpolate between two extremes: χ = 0 is equivalent to rank-by-bid
and χ = 1 is equivalent to rank-by-revenue [7]. Speciﬁcally, given eq
as the estimated click through probability by the publisher for query
q and bq as the bid on q, the ranking score is calculated as bq(eq)χ.
In order to adapt our bid prices to the dynamic ranking mechanism
ranking mechanism adapter β is introduced and unknown eq (eq em-
ployed by the publisher is not revealed to the advertiser) estimated
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using the aggregate Click-Through-Rate (CTR) and denoted as e′q ,
β =
(
1 + e′q
)−χ
=
(
1 +
∑d−1
i=0
Clickq∑d−1
i=0
Impressionq
)−χ
(9)
Based on β, bid price bq stays unchanged if e′q = 0, or χ = 0.
Otherwise, bq is reduced with the increase of either e′q or χ.
2.2 Query Selector
Given limited conversion capacity, query selector selects only a set
of queries to bid on such that the expected available conversions are
allocated to the queries that can potentially generate high proﬁt. The
following algorithm shows the selection process.
1. Preﬁx-ordering queries.
2. Estimate conversion allowance Cw,d+1 for day d+1.
3. Estimate expected conversion of each query cq,d+1 on day d+1.
4. Identify a bidding set of queries A = {1, . . . , s}, s ∈ {1, 16}:
4.1. IF Cw,d+1 ≤ 0 THEN A = φ; GOTO 5.
ELSE initialise s to 1.
4.2. WHILE
∑
q∈A cq,d+1 < Cw,d+1 and s < 16
DO s = s + 1.
4.3. A = {1, 2, . . . , s}.
5. Set l =∞ for each q ∈ A and l = 0 for each q /∈ A.
As we can see, the output of query selector is a set of spend limits.
Selected queries are not restricted by a spend limit, thus their spend
limit is set to inﬁnite. Unselected queries will not be active on day
d+1 so that their spend limit is set to zero. The intuition here is: by
estimating conversion allowance, the maximum number of conver-
sion before expected conversion proﬁt drops to zero is revealed; by
preﬁx-ordering and selecting ﬁrst s queries to put in the bidding set
A, we make sure the allowance is used by high-proﬁt queries only.
The remainder of this section explains how Step 1, 2 and 3 work.
Preﬁx-ordering Preﬁx-ordering [8] is used to sort and preﬁx
queries in the descending order of their proﬁt-per-conversion (PPC).
A query’s PPC is calculated as follows,
PPC =
∑0
i=d−1 revenuei −
∑0
i=d−1 costi∑0
i=d−1 conversioni
(10)
where values of variables are obtained from market reports.
Conversion Allowance Referring to the discussion of distribution
capacity adapter in Section 2.1.2, expected conversion allowance is
the difference between Ccrit and conversions of four recent days in-
cluding day d which can be estimated as cagg,d − cd−4, (cagg,d is
given by Formula 7). Once Ccap is exceeded, every additional con-
version lowers timely conversion rate Pconversion,t by λ = 0.995.
Hence, we model Ccrit as Ccrit = Ccap + n where n is the num-
ber of additional conversions by which Pconversion,t reaches a crit-
ical value Pconversion,crit such that expected conversion revenue
equals to conversion cost (clicks needed to generate a conversion
times CPC). At this equilibrium point, n is maximised. Since both
conversion revenue and CPC differ across queries, we introduce gen-
eral conversion revenue v′con as the average revenue with respect to
total conversion and general CPC c′click as average cost with respect
to total clicks from all queries,
v′con =
∑0
i=d−1
∑
q∈all revenueq,i∑0
i=d−1
∑
q∈all conversionq,i
(11)
c′click =
∑0
i=d−1
∑
q∈all costq,i∑0
i=d−1
∑
q∈all clickq,i
(12)
Mathematically, the equilibrium point can be presented as,
v′con = P
−1
conversion,crit · c′click (13)
Since Pconversion,crit equals to Pconversion,std × λn, we have
n = logλ
Pconversion,crit
Pconversion,std
(14)
where Pconversion,std is an average of baseline conversion rates
weighted by the distribution of both queries and search population
towards different focus levels. n decreases with c′click because the
larger the conversion cost the less excess conversion is needed to
reach the equilibrium point. n increases with v′con because the larger
the conversion revenue, it takes more excess conversion to bring
Pconversion,t down from Pconversion,std to Pconversion,crit. Once
n is found, conversion allowance Cw,d+1 can also be obtained,
Cw,d+1 = C
cap + n− (cagg,d − cd−4) (15)
Expected Conversion We model expected conversion of each
query on day d+1 as a product of expected impression, click proba-
bility and conversion rate,
Cq,d+1 = Impressiond+1 · Pclick,d+1 · Pconversion,d+1 (16)
Impressiond+1 is estimated based on impressions occurred on
all queries in last Pr−1burst = 10 days where Prburst is the search
population burst rate. Pconversion,d+1 is estimated as a product of
Pconversion given by Formula 3 and
√
δ (δ is given by Formula 8),
Pconversion,d+1 = Pconversion min
(
1,
√
δ
)
(17)
Pclick,d+1 is dependent on the relevant bid which is already gen-
erated by bid price generator and stored in knowledge base. We ﬁrst
estimate an exponential function [6] for each query to map bid to po-
sition. Then we infer Pclick,d+1 according to distributions of click
probability and continuation probability provided in the game speci-
ﬁcation of TAC AA 2009.
2.3 Ad Display Selector
Finally we discuss how to choose an ad display type t between
Generic and Targeted. Generic ad leads to query’s system default
click-through-rate whereas targeted one can either brings the effec-
tive click-through-rate over or under the system default one depend-
ing on whether query’s component part matches user’s underlying
component preference. Our following heuristic rule works well in
the competition.
t =
{
Generic if qc = CS and qm = MS
Targeted if qc = CS or qm = MS
(18)
Based on this rule, for (non-MS,CS) queries or (MS,non-CS) queries,
targeted ad will cause a lower-than-default click probability from the
users whose underlying product preference disagrees with our prod-
uct speciality. However, this is not a truly adverse result. First, users
with another component preference are less likely to buy our spe-
cialised component. It is pointless to display a generic ad which in-
creases the odds of clicks leading to more cost. Secondly, if a user
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with different manufacturer preference purchases a product made
by our specialised manufacturer, as the manufacturers do not match,
our proﬁt is only the standard value. Because the underlying query
is a MS query, we expect more clicks coming from users with the
same preference to purchase MS products and yield a larger proﬁt of
USP(1+MSB). Since distribution capacity is limited, for users with
different manufacturer preference, we would rather like them less
likely to click on our ads such that the chance of their low-revenue-
same-cost conversion becomes smaller.
3 Evaluation
In this section, AstonTAC is analysed from two aspects: competi-
tion results to identify the successful properties and three controlled
experiments to test robustness of our agent.
3.1 Game Results and Analysis
In TAC AA 2009, AstonTAC ranked 2nd out of 15 teams in both
qualifying games and the ﬁnal. In the ﬁnal, 40 games were played on
server one and server two simultaneously and respectively. We down-
load logs of all forty games run on server one for analysis in which
we are particularly interested in the top three agents - TacTex, Aston-
TAC and Schlemazl - whose average scores in the ﬁnal are $79886,
$76281 and $75408, respectively.
We start with a correlation test to see whether agent’s proﬁt poten-
tial is affected by Ccap. It turns out correlation coefﬁcient between
Ccap and average proﬁt is over 97.7%. This proves the importance of
adapting bidding strategies to Ccap. Such strong correlation also im-
plies that it is only appropriate to make comparison of performance
between agents based on same setting of Ccap or identical number
of each different Ccap in case of analysing aggregate results.
Figure 3. Average revenue and proﬁt of top three agents. The left vertical
axis shows the revenue and the right vertical axis shows the proﬁt. The four
groups of bars, from left to right, represent the averaged revenue of agents
with different capacity: overall (all games), 300, 400 and 500 respectively.
The three curves show the correlation between the proﬁt and capacity for
each of the three agents.
As can be seen in Figure 3, AstonTAC performs the best in terms
of revenue generation. We believe there are two reasons. First, we set
high bid prices for high-value queries to target top positions. High-
value means high expected proﬁt per click and top position brings
maximum number of clicks. Second, we suppress low-proﬁt con-
versions by bidding less on low-value queries and selecting only
proﬁtable keywords to bid on. Moreover, for AstonTAC and Tac-
Tex, proﬁt forms a clear ascending trend against capacity whereas for
Schlemazl there no signiﬁcant proﬁt increase from Ccap = 400 to
Ccap = 500. The particularly low proﬁt and revenue at Ccap = 500
indicates that Schlemazl did not sufﬁciently exploit its conversion
space in high capacity. With 25% incremental capacity brought by
the change of Ccap from 400 to 500, Schlemazl’s average number of
conversion only increases by 0.96%. By contrast, TacTex’s increase
rate is 12.3% and AstonTAC’s is 14.23%.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4. (a) Average CTR (b) Average CPC (c) CPC/CTR of AstonTAC,
Schlemazl and Tactex.
CTR is one of the most important criteria to judge whether an
online advertising campaign is successful. Furthermore, in rank-by-
revenue mechanism, high historical CTR can enhance rank and lower
payment for the same bid. In TAC AA, high CTR is particularly pre-
ferred because parameter χ is always closer to 1 than 0 meaning that
the ranking mechanism is more by-revenue than by-bid. Based on
this, we set high bid prices for high-value queries to target the 1st
slot and highest possible CTR. Conversely, our high CTR results in
comparatively low CPC. Figure 4 shows although our average cost
per click is larger than the other two, but our advantage in CTR
justiﬁes it. The smallest CPC/CTR means our cost increasing speed
against CTR is slower than the other two. To sum up, the rise of cost
is dominated by the rise of revenue, our strategy beneﬁts more from
increased revenue than suffers from increased cost.
Figure 5. Different variance of top three agents in daily conversion.
Moreover, AstonTAC performs well not because it makes sky-high
proﬁt on some days but because it consistently makes large proﬁt
while other agents could earn nothing periodically. This can be jus-
tiﬁed by the low variance in daily conversion. Figure 5 demonstrates
this through visualizing daily conversions of AstonTAC, TacTex and
Schlemazl in a typical ﬁnal game where Ccap is the same for each
agent. As Figure 5 shows, with statistically identical mean, Aston-
TAC’s standard deviation is only 55.9% and 51.2% of that of TacTex
and Shlemazl, respectively. This should largely be attributed to be-
haviour associated with Ccrit which stetches our ability of making
conversions even when Ccap is exceeded.
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3.2 Controlled Experiments
In order to see whether AstonTAC works well in a broader range of
environment such as competing with other agents than participants
in TAC AA, we have purposefully designed three controlled experi-
ments. Table 1 shows settings of each experiment.
Table 1. Controlled game settings
Exp. Participants Capacity Setting Rounds
A AstonTAC, TacTex, Dummy ×6 Game default 80
B AstonTAC, TacTex, AstonBB, Game default 80
AstonRules, Dummy ×4
C AstonTAC, TacTex, Dummy ×6 Identical Ccap 15
Experiment A and B are set in the same way of TAC AA. What is
changed is the participating agents. In Experiment C, all agents are
assigned identical Ccap ∈ {300, 400, 500} in each game.
3.2.1 Experiment A
AstonTAC is the overall winner in Experiment A. In fact, out of 80
games, AstonTAC won 54 whereas TacTex only won the rest 26.
AstonTAC’s average score is 50263(±7944.6) whereas TacTex got
45439(±8254.9). Besides, the deterioration of return-on-investment
and cost-per-click comparing with competition results for TacTex are
more than that of AstonTAC. We believe our relatively stable perfor-
mance is in connection with the unpredictable environment caused
by dummy agents who are expected to exercise stochastic bidding.
Because our bids are based on query’s value, AstonTAC is less af-
fected by environmental unpredictability than other agents. In this
experiment, both AstonTAC and TacTex’s overall performances are
worse than that in the ﬁnal suggesting that social welfare can only be
achieved when every agent bids wisely.
3.2.2 Experiment B
Two more agent are introduced in Experiment B: AstonBB and As-
tonRules. AstonBB was initially developed essentially based on bal-
anced bidding strategy [1]. AstonRules employs heuristic rules to
infer bid according to the position each query receives in each round.
AstonTAC is the overall winner again but with a very small margin
over TacTex. However, our strategy seems quite superior for high
capacity as AstonTAC’s average proﬁt at C500 is $3185 more than
TacTex. We believe both Distribution Capacity Adapter and Query
Selector contribute signiﬁcantly to this result. As for query selector,
the algorithm works better at high Ccap because preﬁx decision gets
preciser with larger capacity. As the number of intelligent agent in-
creases in the game, TacTex’s performance tends to increase rapidly
whereas AstonTAC still being stable. It implies that TacTex may have
the ability to recognise the bidding pattern of other intelligent agents
and act accordingly to undercut the intelligence of their strategy. In
contrast, AstonTAC’s strategy is holistically built on the basis of dy-
namic market-based value per click, which does not need to target
any speciﬁc position such that it cannot be easily undercut. For this
reason, it appears to present stable and reliable performance in what-
ever environment especially unpredictable ones.
3.2.3 Experiment C
In this experiment, agents’ performance can be compared directly
because capacity bias is eliminated. Out of a total of ﬁfteen games,
AstonTAC has won ten (2/3). AstonTAC’s average proﬁt is $50412
and TacTex’s average proﬁt is $47269. Figure 6 shows the overall
CTR of TacTex and AstonTAC with the change of capacity (300,
400 and 500). It can be seen that TacTex’s click-through-rate forms a
declining trend against capacity while AstonTAC’s trend is ascending
which is more compatible with intuitions. Our attention to the most
crucial game parameter Ccap and adaptive bidding strategy designed
through different components accordingly should be the explanation.
For the same reason, it is a signiﬁcant feature for AstonTAC that its
proﬁt increases with the capacity.
Figure 6. CTR trend against change of distribution capacity.
4 Conclusion
AstonTAC has been shown to be successful and stable across a wide
range of TAC AA environments both in the competition and in con-
trolled experiments. In particular, we attribute the success of Aston-
TAC to the strategy used by the bid price generator and the query
selector. Market-based Value Per Click reﬂects the dynamic change
of the market and thus leads to the generation of ﬂexible and adaptive
bidding prices.
The strategies employed here are tailored to the speciﬁc context
of the AA competition. However, due to the similar features of the
TAC ad competition and real sponsored search, we believe that con-
cepts developed for AstonTAC are broadly applicable to an advertiser
agent in a real sponsored search scenario. One of our future work
is to integrate our MVPC-based strategy with large-scale budget-
constraint optimisation approach [6] and apply the agent in a real
pay-per-click auction.
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